he cost associated with running Essay Example for Free

he cost associated with running Essay Candidates should be limited on the amount of money they can spend during a campaign. The cost associated with running for public office is expensive, especially in the case of large national scale elections, but also in smaller local ones. The money factor discourages regular middle class individuals from running for office, often leaving the ballot seriously one sided. If spending limits were placed on campaigns, our government could represent the views and issues of the majority of Americans, rather than only those of the wealthy. Further, if candidates are given a spending limit, they are less likely to take money from supporters who will benefit or profit from a particular view. Candidates then are more likely to make choices based on the good of the community, state, or country, rather than what will bring in the most money. Although mandatory voting could produce both positive and negative outcomes, voting should be a requirement of all Americans. On one hand, forcing people who do not support any of the candidates on the ballot might lead to careless voting. Those citizens who have no knowledge of the people who are running or no interest in voting at all will most likely cast their votes simply to uphold the law. On the other hand however, if all people are required to vote, and they do so in an educated manner, the government could represent all people of our country, rather than only those who choose to vote. Additionally, if Americans are forced to vote, candidates will spend less money campaigning. The months leading up to election become a time of voicing views rather than persuading people to vote in the first place. The decreased spending will, once again, ease the chances of a candidate taking a particular stance on an issue due to the influence of those who donate to their campaign. Texas should not hold partisan elections whereby candidates run as a member of a given political party. In these elections, voters are more likely to vote based upon the party that they support in substitution to the views held by the candidate. In a state that is populated by a majority of Republicans such as Texas, a partisan election would limit the amount of Democratic candidates elected to office, resulting in a severely unbalanced government. Suddenly every public office would be held by a Republican. The only real race in a partisan election would be which Republican to vote for. Furthermore, a non partisan election calls attention to the views of the candidate on an individual level, rather than on the views of the political party to which they belong. Those who do not join parties, or who take a stance that is not supported by any party, are more likely to run for office in a non partisan election. These non partisan elections make holding an office more accessible to a wide variety of candidates, instead of only people who share similar views of Republicans or Democrats.

Is there Democratic Deficit in the EU?

Is there Democratic Deficit in the EU? It is argued by many commentators[1] that there exists a `democratic deficit` within the European Union although others argue[2] that there exists no such `democratic deficit`, there are also those who acknowledge the existence of a `democratic deficit` but that argue that it is not problematic[3]. This assignment will look at those arguments and consider whether or not in despite of numerous reforms the democratic credentials of the EC still remain a concern. This argument will be considered in light of the evolving nature and the role of parliament. It is important first to understand what is meant by the `democratic deficit`. It is difficult to find a common definition however, in basic terms this argument suggests that the European Parliament as the only directly elected body holds too minor a role in the legislative process. Supporters of the `democratic deficit` argument, argue that the European Parliament, as the only elected and democratic element of the European Community, should exert more power over the legislative process and that the current situation means that the legislative process is controlled by the non-elected Council. It is argued that one of the major problems that this `democratic deficit` creates is a possibility that â€Å"a small minority in a state could be over-represented in the intergovernmental process and thus be able to impose its preferences even in the face of an overwhelming European majority†[4] Conversely those that support the notion that the current situation does not create a `democratic deficit` point to the fact that public interest in elections to the European Parliament is low[5] and as Bermann points out â€Å"participation in elections for European Parliament in June 2004 dropped to a record low of 45.3 percent across the twenty-five member states.† The argument is therefore that even though the MEP’s are, in theory elected by the public, in reality they are not supported by the majority and if they were provided with greater power it would be of little relevance to persons within a member state. This supports the argument, which will be discussed later, that the solution is not to increase the power of the European Parliament but to increase the power of member states within the legislative process. In order to understand the evolution of the European Parliament it is important to consider briefly the legislative process and the growth of European Parliament’s role in that process. Originally a limited number of Treaty Articles[6] provided that the Council was required to consult the European Parliament as to its opinion before arriving at a decision on Community secondary law[7]. This position was confirmed by the case of Roquette Freres SA v Commission[8], although the Council was permitted to ignore and overrule any opinion expressed by the European Parliament[9]. The Maastricht reforms amended Art 251. The new regime creates a co-decision procedure whereby the European Parliament can reject a legislative proposal. Once the European Parliament has provided its views on a legislative proposal, the Council shall adopt a common position by a qualified majority. The European Parliament can, within three months, either approve or take no decision in which case the Council can adopt the measure. Alternatively the European Parliament can reject or amend the proposal by an absolute majority, if this situation occurs then the Council can approve those amendments by a qualified majority within a three month time limit. However if the Commission has issued a negative opinion on the amendments, the Council are only able to approve by unanimity. If the Council does then not agree this amended proposal it will be referred to a new Conciliation Committee to in an effort to accomplish a compromise within six weeks. If a joint text is approved, the Council and European Parliament can then accept the provision together within six weeks and the European Parliament may finally reject it within six weeks by an absolute majority. It is arguable that these reforms do not go far enough in addressing the `democratic deficit` and that they only provide a negative power of veto and in addition they will only apply to limited specific areas. Further changes were introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which whilst go someway to decreasing the democratic deficit do not, it is argued, go far enough. The Treaty of Amsterdam increased the use of and streamlined the co-decision procedure. The Treaty also extended the areas in which the assent of the Parliament is to be required to incorporate the structural and cohesion funds. However, it is pointed out that these do not actually increase the level of participation of the European Parliament and its capacity to insist on a specific measure and thus do little to reduce the `democratic deficit` and make the Union more democratic[10]. Finally changes were implemented via the Nice Treaty, although these were very limited in scope and did little to improve the `democratic deficit`. Although they it did extend the Qualified Majority Voting into new areas and also increased the effect of the co-decision procedure which was extended to include more treaty articles. The changes proposed in the Constitution for Europe[11] are likely to set the foundation of the legislative procedures for many years to come and in this regard they are very important. There are essentially three main changes that are proposed by the constitution which seek to improve the `democratic deficit`. The first of these is that there should be more involvement of the European Parliament in the adoption of all EU legislation and this is to be achieved by greater use of the â€Å"Co-decision procedure†, which it is intended, will be the normal procedure for enactment of legislation. The second change that is proposed by the Constitution is that the member states’ parliament has a greater involvement. One of the main proposals is to enact a procedure whereby national parliaments can register formal objections to a European Commission proposal because it failed to respect the principle of subsidiarity[12]. The final proposal is that Council meetings must be public or televised where legislative procedures are being discussed or voted upon, whether or not these proposals will rectify the `democratic deficit` remains to be seen. It is too early to conclude whether or not this will solve the problem. There are two main suggestions for the improvement of democracy in Europe. The first argument, and the one which has been the subject of this assignment, is to increase the power of the European Parliament. The second suggestion involves increasing the power of national parliaments in the legislative process as the general public have little interest in who is elected into the European Parliament. Steiner and Woods consider this second argument but conclude that â€Å"at the level of individual pieces of legislation, national parliaments become involved in the process too late to have any real impact on the outcome, and the level of control exercised by the individual national parliaments may vary significantly between Member States[13]†. Despite the increased power given to the European Parliament following the various treaties that have been discussed above, and as Weiler points out, the European Parliament â€Å"is still characterised by a lesser degree of parliamentary representation and majority decision making in the European political process than its counterparts in national democracies[14]†. However Dehousse[15] argues that the argument that there is a democratic deficit is fundamentally flawed and that the EU encounters similar problems with democracy as are encountered in domestic systems and that some of the â€Å"loudest complaints over a European democratic deficit may be based on idealisations of democracy in the nation-state†. Those who do not support the concept of a `democratic deficit` argue that â€Å"the preoccupation with the concept of democratic deficit is limiting and does little to improve our understanding of the role of the European Parliament†[16]. Finally, Majone argu es that the EU is a â€Å"regulatory state-a state which despite its democratic deficit can be accountable†[17]. Having considered the arguments it seems clear that perhaps one of the primary reasons for the belief that there exists a `democratic deficit` is that powers that were once controlled by national parliaments have now been transferred to the EU where they are subject to a lower degree of parliamentary participation[18]. Therefore it is argued that the `democratic deficit` does exist, but only in so far as it does not match political ideologies and does not mirror the political system of other member states. It is arguable that deficit does not in fact exist and that the EU system is simply different to member states political systems. Even if it could be concluded that a `democratic deficit` did exist how to correct this deficit is problematic in itself. Some argue that a democratic model similar to that of the state should be developed whereas others argue that democracy can only be achieved through national democracies.[19] One certainty is that it is an argument that will not be se ttled in the near future and it is doubtful that the constitution will resolve the problem to the satisfaction of all member states. Bibliography Cases EP v Council (C-65/91) Parliament v Council (C-392/95) Roquette Freres SA v Commission (Case 20/88) [1989] ECR 1553 Treaties Maastricht Treaty 1997 Nice Treaty Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 Journal Articles Barnard C, Dashwood A, (2006) â€Å"The EU Constitution – Dealing with the Deficit†, 156 New Law Journal 173 Bermann G, Monet J Gelhorn W, (2005) â€Å"Executive Power in the New European Constitution†, International Journal of constitutional Law 3.2 (440) Maduro M, (2005) â€Å"The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism†, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (332) Majone G, (1998) â€Å"Europes Democratic Deficit: The Question of Standards†4 European Law Journal 5 Weiler J, (2005) â€Å"On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography†, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173) Books Craig P De Bà ºrca G, (2003)†EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Third Edition, Oxford University Press Fairhurst J , (2004) â€Å"Law of the European Union†, Fifth Edition, Pearson Longman Harlow C, (2002) â€Å"Accountability in The European Union†, Oxford University Press, Oxford Hartley T, (2003) â€Å"The Foundations of European Community Law†, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press Horspool M Humphreys M, (2006) â€Å"European Union Law†, Oxford University Press Lenaerts K Van Nuffel P,(2005)†Constitutional Law of the European Union†, Second Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Steiner J Woods L, (2003) â€Å"Textbook on EC Law†, Eighth Edition, Oxford University Press Weatherill S, (2005) â€Å"Cases and Materials on EU Law†, Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press Weiler J Winds M (eds) (2003) â€Å"European Constitutionalism Beyond the State†, Cambridge University Press Websites http://european-convention.eu.int/ accessed on 21.10.2006 1 Footnotes [1] See for example the comments of Weiler J, (2005) â€Å"On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography†, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173) [2] See for example the comments of Dehousse R in Weiler J Winds M (eds) (2003) â€Å"European Constitutionalism Beyond the State†, Cambridge University Press [3] See for example Majone G, (1998) â€Å"Europes Democratic Deficit: The Question of Standards†4 European Law Journal 5 [4] Weiler J, (2005) â€Å"On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography†, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173) [5] Bermann G, Monet J Gelhorn W, (2005) â€Å"Executive Power in the New European Constitution†, International Journal of constitutional Law 3.2 (440) [6] 17 [7] old Arts 54 or 56 [8] (Case 20/88) [1989] ECR 1553 [9] Although consider EP v Council (C-65/91) and Parliament v Council (C-392/95) where the Court annulled Regulations which the Council had amended without further Consultation to the European Parliament. [10]Lenaerts K Van Nuffel P,(2005)†Constitutional Law of the European Union†, Second Edition, Sweet and Maxwell at page [11] http://european-convention.eu.int/ accessed on 21.10.2006 [12] For further discussion see Barnard C, Dashwood A , (2006) â€Å"The EU Constitution – Dealing with the Deficit†, 156 New Law Journal 173 [13] Steiner J Woods L, (2003) â€Å"Textbook on EC Law†, Eighth Edition, Oxford University Press at page 25 [14]Weiler J, (2005) â€Å"On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography†, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (173) [15]Dehousse R in Weiler J Winds M (eds) (2003) â€Å"European Constitutionalism Beyond the State†, Cambridge University Press – Chapter 6 Page 135 [16] Harlow C, (2002) â€Å"Accountability in The European Union†, Oxford University Press, Oxford See Chapter 1 generally [17] Majone G, (1998) â€Å"Europes Democratic Deficit: The Question of Standards†4 European Law Journal 5 [18] Maduro M, (2005) â€Å"The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism†, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (332) [19] Maduro M, (2005) â€Å"The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism†, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3.2 (332)

Price of Glory :: essays papers

Price of Glory A new movie called "The Price of Glory" is opening Friday, March 31,2000 all over. However, this movie will only be out for two weeks, if the community does not support it. This a movie about a Latino boxing family and it is refreshing to see a movie about a Latino family where the roles are actually played by Latino actors. The movie stars Jimmy Smitts, Jon Seda, and Paul Rodriguez in a role you wouldn't expect. We got the chance to preview the movie last night and it is a great movie with a lot of comedy and still very heart-warming. An actor from American Me was there promoting the movie and he said that the African-American community has organized a group called the Weekend group and every time a new movie comes out starring an African-American actor or director over 2 million people go to the opening day and support the movie.They are trying to get a similar group started in the Latino community. Actor or director over 2 million people go to the opening day and support the movie.They are trying to get a similar group started in the Latino community. If you are tired of seeing us in roles of gang-bangers, gardeners, housemaids, here's a chance to do something about it and enjoy an excellent movie. The movie will not be getting a lot of publicity at all so spread the word, and if you see it and like it, go see it again! If it makes a difference, OZOMATLI is on the soundtrack!: Pass the word. The movie stars Jimmy Smits (formerly of N.Y.P.D. Blue): "...The Sacramento Hispanic Chamber or Commerce was responsible for bringing the premier of "The Price of Glory" to Sacramento. It is an excellent movie. You really have to go see it. At the premier they announced that the movie will begin showing on March 31st. They told us *how important it is to go see a movie the first two weekends that it is out.

leadership Essay -- essays research papers

â€Å"Unlocking the Potential of Your Employees: The Not-So-Secret Secrets of Motivational Leadership†   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Leadership is executing strategy through others. The most demanding aspect of the job leadership is to get people to do what they are expected to do and to do it well and with motivations to overcome any barriers. â€Å"Successful execution begins with understand why people do what they do.†   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  This article talks about some insights into how to obtain and sustain employee commitment and motivation. The authors talks about how psychologist view motivation. Freud argued people are basically lazy and must be coerced to work. However, common sense alone says that if it were, true, managers would open all of their time watching people who refuse to cooperate.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Maslow came up with the â€Å"hierarchy of needs†. He said that people must meet his theory in sequence, before they can reach the next level. The needs start with basic physiological requirements and move on to safety, belonging, and esteem. The author claims that Maslow’s theory is incomplete because â€Å"employees who feel unappreciated and undervalued will often not feel satisfied at work and this may not work to their full potential.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  According to David McClellan’s hypothesis said humans are motivated by achievement, power and affiliation.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The author writes how these psychological theories gi...

Louis MacNiece: anomalous displacement and post-colonial identity :: Essays Papers

Louis MacNiece: anomalous displacement and post-colonial identity I was the rector’s son, born to the anglican order, Banned forever from the candles of the Irish poor (â€Å"Carrickfergus†) Ireland inhabits a unique position within the current framework of post-colonial literature and theory. The history of Ireland and it’s relationship to England, from the twelfth century (when Henry II was decreed feudal lord of Ireland by the Pope) to the present day, is the history of a divided colonial nation synonymous with ideas of displacement, identity and culture. Indeed, Ireland may be understood as both colonial and post-colonial, sitting uncomfortably on the fence between labels of post-colonial discourse such as first and third world. Stephen Slemon’s evocative essay, â€Å"Unsettling the Empire: Resistance Theory for the Second World†, suggests the notion of a ‘second world’, or a semi-periphery in post-colonial theory, as a method of transcending myopic binarisms (104 - 110). Slemon argues that the critical and theoretical space created by the alternative of a second world accommodates the difficult examples of the post-colonial, white, settler cultures of Australia, New Zealand, southern Africa and Canada. Ireland, with regard to both the historical experience and to Irish cultural expression and production, is a further country which may be fruitfully situated in this space. The requirement of a ‘second world’ in post-colonial theory becomes glaringly obvious in a consideration of Ireland. As Liam Kennedy concludes, in a comparative analysis of Ireland to Asian and African post-colonial nations on economic grounds, â€Å"attempting to place Ireland in a Third World perspective turned out to be a largely empty enterprise† (Modern Ireland 114). The attempt to propose Ireland as a Third World nation has been common amongst various scholars. For example, in a Field Day pamphlet, Frederic Jameson claims the Dublin of Joyce’s fiction to be â€Å"an underdeveloped village† (Kennedy 107). Kennedy’s study clearly emphasises the fact that Ireland is economically a member of the First World, comparable to Western European countries as opposed to those of the developing world. Ireland’s Gross Domestic Product per head of population in 1913 was valued at US$655 compared to the 1960 figures of US$198 for Ghana and US$74 for India (Kennedy 110). To take a more contemporary view, the World Bank’s World Development Report 1991 shows that in 1989 Ireland was not a member of the Third World. The report, drawing on accepted measurements of wealth and social conditions such as GNP, diet, infant mortality rate, life expectancy, reliance on agriculture and illiteracy, demonstrates the incongruous nature of claiming a Third World status for Ireland.

Biological Explanation of Unipolar Depression

One biological explanation for unipolar depression is the monoamine hypothesis. The monoamines are a group of neurotransmitters which include serotonin, noradrenaline and dopamine. You will recognise the latter, dopamine, from the biological offering of an explanation for schizophrenia. The monoamines are believed to regulate mood. One of the functions of serotonin is to regulate the other neurotransmitters. Without the regulation provided by serotonin, erratic brain functioning and thinking patterns occur.Low levels of serotonin produces low levels of noradrenaline (a neurotransmitter needed for alertness, energy, anxiety and attention to life). Evidence suggests that low levels of noradrenaline cause depression, and high levels cause mania, which suggests it is involved both in unipolar and bipolar depression. Dopamine is also related to feelings of alertness, motivation and attention, and so it is suggested low levels of dopamine similarly are linked to depression.Essentially the monoamine hypothesis suggests that low levels of dopamine and low levels of noradrenaline result in depressive moods, and low levels of serotonin mean low levels of noradrenaline. It can therefore be low levels of dopamine or noradrenaline that result in depression, or a mixture of both. The hypothesis is used to work with drug treatment, so that the correct drugs (antidepressants) can be prescribed based on the particular monoamine in question. In other words, when a clinician is presented with a patient, they will choose the correct drug that alleviates the presented symptoms of depression.Most antidepressants work by increasing levels of serotonin. It cannot be concluded that the explanation for depression is strictly biological. The diathesis-stress model explains how some mental disorders can have a biological underlying cause but require an environmental trigger to become active. Evaluation: One strength of the biological explanation of depression is that there is further empi rical support provided by Ogilvie et al. (1996). They showed that cells use a gene called SERT to make serotonin transporter protein which plays an important role in the transmission of information between neurons.In most people, part of this gene called the second intron contains 10-12 repeating sections of DNA. However, people with depression, only have 9 repeating sections of DNA. This suggests that there is wider academic support for the idea that serotonin is strongly associated with depression. There is much sound evidence to support the theory, particularly in treatment – if the hypothesis suggests the symptoms are due to monoamine deficiencies and drugs which replace those monoamines alleviate the symptoms, there is evidence for the hypothesis Kraft et al. 2005) studied 96 depressed patients treated over 6 weeks with SNRI (increases levels of noradrenaline) had a reduction in depressive symptoms compared to those treated with a placebo. Leonard (2000) drugs that lower noradrenaline levels have been found to bring about depressive states. Therefore increasing noradrenaline should decrease depressive symptoms . However, The influence of noradrenaline is recognised by the effects of antidepressant drugs which aim to increase levels of noradrenaline.However, these drugs may also affect other neurotransmitters, so it is difficult to find a clear connection and can be interlined with the critiscism that it is difficult to establish cause and effect. It the chemical imbalance in the brains of depressed people the cause of the depression or the effect of depression? This issue is further complicated by the fact that the answer may be different for different types of depression. In endogenous depression perhaps the chemical imbalance comes first, but the other way round in reactive depression.Supporting evidence for the biochemical explanation of depression is that it has practical applications From research into the effectiveness of treatments such as E CT and drugs. ECT supports the biochemical explanation because one shock of 110 volts is passed through the brain of depressives for up to 4 seconds. This results in convulsions of up to 2 mins. 6-9 treatments are given of 2-4 weeks. For 60-70% of people with depression, ECT works quickly and effectively. As drugs and ECT alter the balance of chemicals in the brain, it suggests clinicians can improve the quality of people’s lives.One weakness of the biological explanation of depression is that there are individual differences. Not everyone who suffers from depression is helped by serotonin-based drugs, which suggests that there are other causes of the disorder. It is also not clear why some people become depressed when their serotonin or norepinephrine level is low, whereas others with the low neurotransmitter level remain depression-free. This suggests that the results gained from such research cannot be generalised to the whole population. Another weakness of the research i s that it is biologically deterministics.The reason for this is because it suggests that individuals who have low levels of serotonin are determined to suffer from depression in later life, however, people have a choice about their behaviour and whether they want to do anything about it. This suggests that the biological explanation does not account for free will. A final weakness of the biological explanation of depression is that it is reductionist. The reason for this is because it explains depression in terms of genes (SERT) and neurotransmitters (serotonin) and ignores psychological factors such as learning.This suggests that the biological explanation is oversimplistic when explaining depression. Alternative explanations for depression is cognitive explanations which is accounted by Beck (1974) who , cognitive theories assume that people's attributions for events, their perceptions of control and self-efficacy, and their beliefs about themselves and the world influence their b ehaviors and emotions when reacting to a situation. In general, an individual with various maladaptive beliefs and attitudes becomes more vulnerable to depression because of his or her generalized negative belief pattern.

Economics story

The Indian Economy Since Independence India Wins Freedom On 14 August 1947, Nehru had declared: â€Å"Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge. The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an opening of oopportunity, to the great triumph and achievments that await us. † He reminded the country that the tasks ahead iincluded â€Å"the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of oopportunity†. These were the basic foundations on which India embarked upon its path of development since gaining independence in 1947.The purpose of this talk is to analyze how much has India really achieved in the last 55 years in fulfilling the aspirations on which it was founded. Indian Planning process The objective of India’s development strategy has been to establish a socialistic pattern of society through economic growth with self-reliance, social justice and alleviation of poverty. These objectives were to be achieved within a democratic political framework using the mechanism of a mixed economy where both public and private sectors co-exist. India initiated planning for national economic development with the establishment of the Planning Commission.The aim of the First Five Year Plan (1951-56) was to raise domestic savings for growth and to help the economy resurrect itself from colonial rule. The real break with the past in planning came with the Second Five Year Plan (Nehru-Mahalanobis Plan). The industrialization strategy articulated by Professor Mahalanobis placed emphasis on the development of heavy industries and envisaged a dominant role for the public sector in the economy. The entrepreneurial role of the state was evoked to develop the industrial sector. Commanding heights of the economy were entrusted to the public sector.The objectives of industrial ppolicy were: a high growth rate, national self-reliance, reduction of foreign dominance, building up of indigenous c apacity, encouraging small scale industry, bringing about balanced regional development, prevention of concentration of economic power, reduction of income inequalities and control of economy by the State. The planners 1 and ppolicy makers suggested the need for using a wide vvariety of instruments like state allocation of investment, licensing and other regulatory controls to steer Indian industrial development on a closed economy basis.The strategy underlying the first three plans assumed that once the growth process gets established, the institutional changes would ensure that benefits of growth trickle down to the poor. But doubts were raised in the early seventies about the effectiveness of the ‘trickle down’ approach and its ability to banish poverty. Further, the growth itself generated by the planned approach remained too weak to create adequate surpluses- a prerequisite for the ‘trickle down’ mechanism to work. Public sector did not live upto the e xpectations of generating surpluses to accelerate the pace of capital accumulation and help reduce inequality.Agricultural growth remained constrained by perverse institutional conditions. There was unchecked population growth in this period. Though the growth achieved in the first three Five Year Plans was not insignificant, yet it was not sufficient to meet the aims and objectives of development. These brought into view the weakness of economic strategy. We discuss the failure of the planning process in more detail in the next section. A shift in ppolicy was called for. The Fifth Plan (1974-79) corrected its course by initiating a program emphasizing growth with redistribution.To accelerate the process of production and to align it with contemporary realities, a mild version of economic liberalization was started in the mid 1980s. Three important committees were set up in the early 1980s. Narsimhan Committee on the shift from physical controls to fiscal controls, Sengupta Committe e on the public sector and the Hussain Committee on trade ppolicy. The result of such thinking was to reorient our economic policies. As a result there was some progress in the process of deregulation during the 1980s. Two kinds of delicencing aactivity took place.First, thirty two groups of industries were delicensed without any investment limit. Second, in 1988, all industries were exempted from licensing except for a specified negative list of twenty six industries. Entry into the industrial sector was made easier but exit still remained closed and sealed. Hence, the roots of the liberalization program were started in the late 80’s when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister of India, but the reach and force of the reform 2 program was rather limited. There were political reasons as to why this program could not be enhanced which we talk about later.The Failure of the Planning Process While the reasons for adopting a centrally directed strategy of development were understanda ble against the background of colonial rule, it, however soon became clear that the actual results of this strategy were far below expectations. Instead of showing high growth, high public savings and a high degree of self-reliance, India was actually showing one of the lowest rates of growth in the developing world with a rising public deficit and a periodic balance of payment crises.Between 1950 and 1990, India’s growth rate averaged less than 4 per cent per annum and this was at a time when the developing world, including Sub-Saharan Africa and other least developed countries, showed a growth rate of 5. 2 % per annum. An important assumption in the choice of post-independence development strategy was the generation of public savings, which could be used for higher and higher levels of investment. However, this did not happen, and the public sector-instead of being a generator of savings for the community’s good- became, over time, a consumer of community’s sa vings.This reversal of roles had become evident by the early seventies, and the process reached its culmination by the early eighties. By then, the government began to borrow not only to meet its own revenue expenditure but also to finance public sector deficits and investments. During 1960-1975, total public sector borrowings averaged 4. 4 % of GDP. These increased to 6 % of GDP by 1980-81, and further to 9 % by 1989-90. Thus, the public sector, which was supposed to generate resources for the growth of the rest of the economy, gradually became a net drain on the society as a whole.I will now try to give some reasons for the deterioration of the public sector in India. 1) The legal system in India is such that it provides full protection to the private interests of the so called ‘public servant’, often at the expense of the public that he or she is supposed to serve. In addition to complete job security, any group of public servants in any public sector organization ca n go on strike in search of higher wages, promotions and bonuses for themselves, irrespective of the costs and 3 nconvenience to the public. Problems have become worse over time and there is little or no accountability of the public servant to perform the public duty. 2) The ‘authority’ of governments, at both center and states, to enforce their decisions has eroded over time. Government can pass orders, for example, for relocation of unauthorized industrial units or other structures, but implementation can be delayed if they run counter to private interests of some (at the expense of the general public interest). ) The process and procedures for conducting business in government and public service organizations, over time, have become non-functional. There are multiplicity of departments involved in the simplest of decisions, and administrative rules generally concentrate on the process rather than results. There is very little decentralization of decision-making power s, particularly financial powers. Thus, while local authorities have been given significant authority in some states for implementing national programmes, their financial authority is limited.Hence during early 90’s it was imperative for India to correct its clearly faulty developmental process. There have been several reasons put forward for the failure of the developmental path which necessitated the reforms of Manmohan Singh in 1991. The way I would approach the analysis is through the approach of comparing and contrasting the viewpoints of two of the most prominent Indian economists of our times. The Bhagwati-Sen debate Jagdish Bhagwati and Amartya Sen, probably the two most influential voices amongst Indian economists, represent the two divergent ways of thinking about the development path.Though formally no such debates exists, apart from occasional jibes against Sen in the writings of Bhagwati, I believe by scrutinizing their positions a lot of introspection can be don e. As Bhagwati says â€Å"my view as to what went wrong with Indian planning is completely at odds with that of Prof Sen†. My objective in this section is bring 4 out the intellectual divergence amongst these two great minds and possibly to learn something from that. Let us start with the points on which they agree.I think the fact that India needs an egalitarian development path is quite well acknowledged by both of them. The Nehruvian dream of an egalitarian growth process was what both of them would endorse. As Bhagwati says â€Å"I have often reminded the critics of Indian strategy, who attack it from the perspective of poverty which is juxtaposed against growth, that it is incorrect to think that the Indian planners got it wrong by going for growth rather than attacking poverty: they confuse mearns with ends.In fact, the phrase â€Å"minimum income† and the aim of providing it to India’s poor were very much part of the lexicon and at the heart of our think ing and analysis when I worked at the Indian Planning Commission in the early 1960’s†. The key strategy that defined the resulting developmental effort was the decision to target efforts at accelerating the growth rate. Given the immensity of the poverty, the potential of simple redistribution was considered to be both negligible in its immediate impact and of little sustained value. Accelerated growth was thus regarded as an instrumental variable; a ppolicy outcome that would in turn reduce poverty.He goes on to argue â€Å"Those intimately associated in India’s plans fully understood, contrary to many recent assertions, the need for land reforms, for attention to the possibility of undue concentration of economic power and growth in inequality. These ‘social tasks’, which of course also can redound to economic advantage, were attended to and endlessly debated in the ensuing years, with reports commissioned (such as the Mahalanobis Committee report on income distribution in 1962) and policies continually revised and devised to achieve these social outcomes†.If we follow the writings of Sen on the other hand, in his recent book â€Å"Development As Freedom†, Sen argues that â€Å"the usefulness of wealth lies in the things that it allows us to do- the substantive freedoms it helps us to achieve†¦. an adequate conception of development must go much beyond the accumulation of wealth and the growth of gross national product and other income-related variables. Without ignoring the importance of economic growth, we must look well beyond it†. I don’t think that there is any divergence of view on this front with that of what Bhagwati says.It is worth mentioning at this juncture that this has been a common misconception amongst economists about the divergence of two different developmental paths. It is often misunderstood that Bhagwati’s 5 view stresses just on economic growth while Sen argues ag ainst economic growth and the importance of markets. The above paragraphs reveal that this is certainly not the case. Both of them is sufficiently concerned with economic growth as well as the basic issues of poverty, health and social issues. The points of divergence I believe the real disparity concerns the mearns of achieving these common goals.Bhagwati’s arguments can be summarized as follows. The development process consists of two steps. As a first step, a growth accelerated strategy would generate enhanced investments and whose objective was to jolt the economy up into a higher investment mode that would generate a much higher growth rate. The planning framework rested on two legs. First, it sought to make the escalated growth credible to private iinvestors so that they would proceed to invest on an enhanced basis in a self-fulfilling prophecy.Second, it aimed at generating the added savings to finance the investments so induced. His argument crucially rested on the fo llowing logical theory. For the higher growth rate to achieve it is very important for the economy concerned to be open. If the effective exchange rate for exports over the effective exchange rate for imports (signifying the relative profitability of the foreign over the home market), ensured that the world markets were profitable to aim for, guaranteeing in turn that the inducement to invest was no longer constrained by the growth of the domestic market.It is worthwhile to recount India’s performance as far as the public sector savings is concerned, which was considered a major hindrance towards the success of the Indian plans. Continuing with the argument, the generation of substantial export earnings enabled the growing investment to be implemented by imports of equipment embodying technical change. If the Social Marginal Product of this equipment exceeded the cost of its importation, there would be a ‘surplus’ that would accrue as an income gain to the econom y and boost the growth rate.The role of literacy and education comes at the next stage. The pproduactivity of the imported equipment would be greater with a workforce that was literate and would be further enhanced if many had even secondary education. Now his argument is based on the fact that the enhanced growth would demand and lead to a more educated workforce. Thus 6 he considers that primary education and literacy plays an enhancing, rather than initiating role in the developmental process. Sen on the other hand considers a larger view of development.He believes that questions such as whether certain political or social freedoms, such as the liberty of political participation and dissent, or opportunities to receive basic education, are or not â€Å"conducive to development† misses the important understanding that these substantive freedoms are among the constituent components of development. Their relevance for development does not have to be freshly established throug h their indirect contribution to the growth of GNP or to the promotion of industrialization.While the causal relation, that these freedoms and rights are also very effective in contributing to economic progress, the vindication of freedoms and rights provided by this causal linkage is over and above the directly constitutive role of these freedoms in development. I think that it is precisely at this point where some of Sen’s writings on economics and philosophy should be considered. According to Sen, economics as a discipline has tended to move away from focusing on the value of freedoms to that of utilities, incomes and wealth. This narrowing of focus leads to an underappreciation of the full role of the market mechanism.For example, take the example of the most important finding on the theory of the markets- the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. That theorem shows that a competitive economic system can achieve a certain type of efficiency (Pareto efficiency to be precise) which a c entralized system cannot achieve, and this is due to reasons of incentives and information problems. But if we suppose that no such imperfections do exist and the same competitive equilibrium can be brought about by a dictator who announces the production and allocation decision, then are these two outcomes the same?In a much celebrated paper, Sen brings out the distinction between â€Å"culmination outcomes† (that is, the only final outcomes without taking any note of the process of getting there) and â€Å"comprehensive outcomes† (taking note of the process through which the culmination outcomes come about). Along these lines we can argue that Sen would disagree with Bhagwati’s point of view in that it does not consider the â€Å"comprehensive outcomes†.Though the outcomes may be the same if we bring about a simultaneous increase in investments in education, health and other social activities, with that of growth, as against a 7 framework where growth b rings about a derived demand for those activities (a la Bhagwati), these are not the same thing. So as we can see, the primary difference in the approach is that Bhagwati argues that poverty and social dimensions can be taken care of in the second step of the development process while Sen argues that social oopportunity is a constitutive element in the developmental process.In this respect it is helpful to scrutinize the East Asian case, where countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (so called Asian Tigers) achieved phenomenal rates of growth in the 80’s and much of the early 90’s. The interesting fact about these countries is that they achieved this with a significant high record on the social dimensions. Both Bhagwati and Sen has commented directly on the achievement of these countries. As Bhagwati states â€Å"The East Asian investment rate began its take-off to phenomenal levels because East Asia turned to the Export promotion (EP) strategy.The elimination of th e ‘bias against exports’, and indeed a net excess of the effective exchange rate for exports over the effective exchange rate for imports (signifying the relative profitability of the foreign over the domestic market), ensured that the world markets were profitable to aim for, guaranteeing in turn that the inducement to invest was no longer constrained by the growth of the domestic market as in the IS strategy†. I personally think that there is nothing disputable in this analysis but it does not strengthen his argument that the social achievements in these countries followed their phase of growth.In fact the pioneering example of enhancing economic growth through social oopportunity, especially in basic education, is Japan. Japan had a higher rate of literacy than Europe even at the time of the Meiji restoration in the mid nineteenth century, when industrialization had not yet occurred there but had gone on for many decades in Europe. The East Asian experience was also based on ssimilar connections. The contrasts between India and China are also important in this aspect. The governments of both China and India has been making efforts for sometime now to move toward a more open, internationally active, market-oriented economy.While Indian efforts have slowly met with some access, the kind of massive results that China has seen has failed to occur in India. An important factor in this contrast lies in the fact that from a social preparedness standpoint, China is a great deal ahead of India in being able to make use of the market economy. While prereform China was deeply skeptical of markets, it was not skeptical of basic education and 8 widely shared health care. When China turned to marketization in 1979, it already had a highly literate people, especially the young, with good schooling facilities across the bulk of the country.In this respect, China was not very far from the basic educational situation in South Korea or Taiwan, where too an educated population had played a major role in seizing the economic opportunities offered by a supported market system. Indeed it is often argued that it is a mistake to worry about the discord between income achievements and survival chances-in general- the statistical connection between them is observed to be quite close. It is interesting, in this context, to refer to some statistical analyses that have recently been presented by Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion.On the basis of intercountry comparisons, they find that life expectancy does indeed have a significantly positive correlation with GNP per head, but that this relationship works primarily through the impact of GNP on (I) the incomes specifically of the poor and (2) public expenditure particularly in health care. In fact, once these two variables are iincluded on their own in the statistical exercise, little extra explanation can be obtained from including GNP per head as an additional causal influence. The basic point i s that the impact of economic growth depends much on how the fruits of economic growth are used.Sen argues that a focus on issues on basic education, basic health care and land reforms made widespread economic participation easier in many of the East Asian and Southeast Asian economies in a way it has not been possible in, say, Brazil or India, where the creation of social opportunities has been much slower and that slowness has acted as a barrier to economic development. I believe that one has to take note of the examples of say, Sri Lanka, the Indian State of Kerala or pre-reform China where on the contrary, impressive high life expectancy, low fertility, high literacy and so on, have failed to translate into high economic growth.I would like to see a theory which explains this. But to elucidate Sen’s view, he would rather prefer a situation of that of Kerala or Sri Lanka than that of Brazil or India. I would suggest that what one needs is such critical studies which would illuminate the failure of Brazil on one hand as against Sri Lanka on the other, to illustrate the fact that why an egalitarian growth process was not successfully implemented in these cases. We will have useful lessons to learn in that case for the future of development. The debate 9 between Bhagwati and Sen (or rather the created debate in this paper) gives rise to such an agenda.The Reforms of Manmohan Singh At the beginning of 90’s the reform process was started by the then Finance Minsiter of India, Manmohan Singh. The way I will organize this section is the following: First, I will give a short summary of the reform process , in the sense what were its general goals and ideas. Then I will mention some aspects of the reforms which I think are very encouraging. After that I will scrutinize the reforms more stringently in order to assess whether there is real cause for such jubilation that we tend to observe regarding India. (i)The Background: India’s economic reform s began in 1991 under the Narsimha Rao Government. By that time the surge in oil prices triggered by the Gulf War in 1990 imposed a severe strain on a balance of payments already made fragile by several years of large fiscal deficits and increasing external debt as was discussed before. Coming at a time of internal political instability, the balanceof-payments crises quickly ballooned into a crisis of confidence which intensified in 1991 even though oil prices quickly normalized. Foreign exchange reserves dropped to $1. billion in 1991, barely sufficient for two weeks of imports and a default on external payments appeared inevitable. The shortage of foreign exchange forced tightening of import restrictions, which in turn led to a fall in industrial output. A digression: The politics of reforms In a very engaging article on the politics of reforms Ashutosh Varshney has raised an extremely important question as to why was India’s minority government in 1991 successful in introd ucing economic reforms, whereas a much sthronger government, with a three-fourth majority in parliament, was unable to do so in 1985 (under the Prime Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi)?His argument draws a distinction between mass politics and elite politics. He believes that â€Å"this distinction has not been adequately appreciated 10 in the voluminous literature on the politics of economic reforms. Scholars of economic reforms have generally assumed that reforms are, or tend to become, central to politics. Depending on what else is making demands on the energies of the electorate and politicians- ethnic and religious strife, political order and stability, corruption and crimes of the incumbents- the assumption of reforms centrality may not be right†.In the largest ever survey of mass political attitudes in India conducted between April-July 1996, only 19 ppercent of the electorate reported any knowledge of economic reforms, even though reforms had been in existence since July 1 991. Of the rural electorate, only about 14 per cent had heard of reforms, whereas the comparable proportion in the cities was 32 per cent. Further nearly 66 ppercent of the graduates were aware of the dramatic changes in economic ppolicy, compared to only 7 per cent of the poor, who are mostly illiterate.In contrast, close to three-fourths of the electorate – both literates and illiterates, poor and rich, urban and rural- were aware of the 1992 mosque demolition in Ayodhya; 80 per cent expressed clear opinions about whether the country should have a uniform civil code or religiously prescribed and separate laws for mmarriage, divorce, and property inheritance; and 87 per cent took a stand on caste-based affirmative action. Thus according to Varshney, elite politics is typically expressed in debates and struggles within the institutionalized settings of a bureaucracy, of a parliament or a cabinet.Mass politics takes place primarily on the streets. In democracies, especially p oor democracies, mass politics can redefine elite politics, for an accumulated expression of popular sentiments and opinions inevitably exercises a great deal of pressure on elected politicians. The economic reform’s during 1991 kept progressing because the political context had made Hindu-Muslim relations and caste animosities the prime determinant of political coalitions. The reforms were crowded out of mass politics by issues that aroused greater passion, and anxiety about the nation.And hence the reforms could go as far as they did. (ii) The Reforms in a Nutshell: The reforms had two broad objectives. One was the reorientation of the economy from a statist, centrally directed and highly controlled economy to what is referred to in the current jargon as a ‘marketfriendly economy’. A reduction direct controls and physical planning was expected to improve the efficiency of the economy. It was to be made more 11 ‘open’ to trade and external flows thr ough a reduction in trade barriers and liberalization of foreign investment policies.A second objective of the reform measures was macro-economic stabilization. This was to be achieved by substantially reducing fiscal deficits and the government’s draft on society’s savings. (iii) Results: Compared with the historical trend, the impact of these policies has been positive and significant. The growth rate of the economy during 1992-93 to 1999-2000 was close to 6. 5 per cent per annum. The balance of payments position has also substantially improved.Despite several external developments, including the imposition of sanctions in 1998 and sharp rise in oil prices in 2000-01, foreign exchange reserves are at a record level. Current account deficits have been moderate, and India’s external debt (as a ppercentage of GDP) and the debt servicing burden have actually come down since the early nineties. There is also evidence of considerable restructuring in the corporate s ector with attention being given to cost-competitiveness and financial viability.The rate of inflation has also come down sharply. (iv) A Closer Scrutiny: When we talk about GDP growth we talk about the aggregate figures. Let us closely look at the sectoral composition. If we look at the growth rates with respect to different sectors we find that the growth rates of agricultural and industrial production have not increased at all in the nineties, compared with the eighties. The increase in overall growth in the 1990’s is overwhelmingly driven by accelerated growth of the ‘service’ sector.The service sector includes some very dynamic fields, such as uses of information technology and electronic servicing, in both of which India has made remarkable progress. This was largely a result of the liberalization policies initiated by Manmohan Singh. Ssimilar comments apply to the phenomenal expansion of software-related export services. Now the relevant question is, what is wrong in the fact that the services sector is driving the growth process in India?What is a bit disturbing is the fact that it is not clear as to the extent to which the rapid growth of the service sector as a whole contributes to the generation of widely-shared employment, the elimination of poverty, and the 12 enhancement of the quality of life. And also employment in the service sector is often inaccessible to those who lack the required skills or education. The current restructuring to the Indian economy towards this skill and education-intensive sector reinforces the resources to a certain ection of the society. How has the Reforms been successful in creating a widely shared developmental process? The issue as to whether the reforms have been successful in eliminating poverty to a greater extent than say in the 80’s is a contentious issue. Experience prior to the 1990s suggests that economic growth in India has typically reduced poverty. Using data from 1958 to 1991, Ravallion and Datt (1996) find that the elasticity of the incidence of poverty with respect to net domestic product per capita was –0. 5 and that with respect to private consumption per capita it was –0. 9. However, the 1990s are more contentious. Some observers have argued that poverty has fallen far more rapidly in the 1990s than previously (for example, Bhalla, 2000). Others have argued that poverty reduction has stalled and that the poverty rate may even have risen (for example, Sen, 2001). The basic question of measuring India’s poverty rate has turned out to be harder to answer than it needed to be because of difficulties with coverage and comparability of the survey data.Correcting for all those, Datt and Ravallion in a recent study find that India has probably maintained its 1980s rate of poverty reduction in the 1990s, though they do not find any convincing evidence of an acceleration in the decline of poverty. It is probably apt to remark here that oft entimes the public rhetoric fails to take the incomparability problems in the surveys from which the poverty estimates are calculated and try to interpret the estimates to reinforce their particular arguments.Even the Finance Minister’s ‘budget speech’ of Feb 2001 coincluded firmly that ‘poverty has fallen from 36 ppercent in 1993-4 to 26 ppercent or less now’. It is worth noting that even if one were to endorse the official 1999-2000 headcount ratio of 26 per cent, which is known to be biased downwards, one would find that poverty reduction in the 90s has proceeded at a ssimilar rates as in the earlier decades, in spite of a significant acceleration in the economic growth rate. As things stand, this is the most optimistic reading of the available evidence.All of the estimates were made with respect to head-count indexes. I think it is necessary to move away from this narrow index and to consider a broader range of social 13 indicators. Much of the d ebate in this area has focused on what has happened to expenditure on social sector development in the post reform period. Dev and Mooji (2002) find that central